Second, like Hamas, they are expert at hiding: be that in the mountains, underground or in civilian areas. This makes pre-planned strikes difficult. Their weapon launchers are mobile or disposable and hard to locate until they actually fire. A volley of drones can launch from a cheap set of tubular frames which are then abandoned. Missiles are fired from trucks which then immediately move off. Even if a Tomahawk cruise missile is fired in response as soon as a Houthi launch is detected, it will not arrive for say half an hour. This is like punching smoke. If a carrier fighter can luckily be close by above a launch the reaction time can be shortened, but probably not by enough to be decisive. What’s needed is a way to know where the weapons are before they launch.

So the key question in all of this is “does a massive increase in firepower change this picture?” Then, is what we’re seeing now even a massive increase?

The rhetoric suggests it is but then, it would. The answer is we don’t know, and we don’t know if it will work either, not for a while. But without a significant change in the situation it probably won’t.

The big issue is the ongoing reluctance to put boots on the ground. This has carried over administrations but if you wanted to change the dynamic there it’s one to think about. Nobody, I suspect, would advocate a US invasion of Yemen: but Special Forces ashore there could wreak havoc and improve targeting intelligence for seaborne and airborne weaponry considerably. There are also lots of Yemenis and other local allies who are not friends of the Houthis and would be glad to join in against them. This type of ground campaign, similar to the war against ISIS/Daesh as opposed to Iraq and Afghanistan style attempts at regime change and nation building, can actually work well.

If Trump and Hegseth are going to make their war of choice work they need a comprehensive plan that challenges Houthi leadership, finances, supply chains and intelligence networks. It will probably need some form of US boots ashore. Just bombing them probably won’t work.

There are intriguing sub-plots from a UK perspective. Will we join these strikes with Cyprus-based long-haul strikes as we did before? Views on that will depend on whether you think the “special relationship” is worth nurturing, at least at a military level (where to a large extent it has always resided). I do.

The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is on her way home and is due in the Red Sea soon. She will be tracking the threat there very closely. So will UK planners as our own Carrier Strike Group prepares to head through the Red Sea en route to the Indo-Pacific this year. I have argued before that live British carrier operations against Houthi targets under the protective umbrella of the USS Harry S Truman strike group should take precedence over influence operations in the Indo-Pacific: but as ever with carriers, their real strength lies in being able to provide a range of options that can be selected at the last politically safe moment.

As a side note, the new captain of the Truman is Chris “Chowdah” Hill who until late last year was captain of the previous ship to conduct this mission, the USS Dwight D Eisenhower. With barely time to unpack his bags, he has flown back out as temporary captain of Truman as the previous one was relieved after a collision at sea just north of Suez. Commanding one of these ships in a war zone is a tough leadership assignment anyway. Doing it again just after you thought you had finished is even more so. Fair winds to him and his ship’s company: but I don’t think that even the irrepressible Chowdah will be able to silence the Houthis by bombing and Tomahawks alone.

We have to remember that the whole point of this is to reassure merchant shipping so that it returns to its Red Sea routing. It won’t be at all difficult for the Houthis to persuade merchant owners to keep going around Africa, even the odd pot shot a month would probably do it. Mission failed, again.

In sum, Are MAGA missiles better than Biden bombs? No they are not, and unless they are accompanied by a comprehensive strategy to defeat the Houthis, the attacks on commercial ships will continue. Shipping will not be reassured and warships will remain in harm’s way, firing million-dollar missiles at thousand-dollar drones. The reasons for doing this right now are many and complex, but the basic fact of attempting to quell a terrorist militia and preserve freedom of navigation is not.

So, even though I have my doubts, I hope it does work and I am glad the US is standing up for what’s right. The alternative is worse.